Lessons From Inquisitorialism by Slobogin, Christopher
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Slobogin, Lessons From Inquisitorialism, 87 Southern California Law Review. 699 (2014)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/257
Citation: 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 699 2013-2014 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu Jan 22 12:28:08 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   




As implemented in the United States, the adversarial system is a
significant cause of wrongful convictions, wrongful acquittals, and
"wrongful" sentences. Empirical evidence suggests that a hybrid
inquisitorial regime can reduce these erroneous results. This Article
proposes that the American trial process incorporate three inquisitorial
mechanisms-judicial control over the adjudication process,
nonadversarial treatment of experts, and required unsworn testimony by
the defendant-and defends the proposal against constitutional and
practical challenges. While other scholars have suggested borrowing from
overseas, these three proposals have yet to be presented as a package.
Together they might measurably enhance the accuracy of the American
criminal justice system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The wrongful conviction movement has spawned a considerable
amount of second-guessing about the integrity of the American criminal
justice system. Numerous scholars, and some courts, are questioning the
American way of investigating crime, adjudicating guilt, and assigning
punishments. Reform proposals abound, including calls for new
interrogation and identification protocols, the revamping of forensic lab
procedures, the reorganization of prosecutor offices, changes in the
discovery process, increased training of and pay for defense attorneys, and
modification of various aspects of the jury, appellate and postconviction
systems.1
All of these proposals have some merit. But most tinker with the
current system rather than seek to restructure it. In other words, they accept
the premise of the adversarial system-that the parties should be in control
of producing the evidence used to adjudicate guilt and punishment. That
premise puts the prosecution and defense in charge of the trial and, through
the institution of plea bargaining, largely in charge of sentencing as well.
If the goal is to improve the accuracy of the criminal justice system,
reforms that accept the adversarial premise are not enough, especially if the
accuracy goal encompasses a desire to do something about wrongful
acquittals and punishments as well as wrongful convictions. This Article
assumes that our criminal justice system has an accuracy problem and
argues that, in an effort to alleviate that problem, consideration should be
given to significantly modifying its adversarial thrust. Fundamental change,
not just a tweaking of the existing framework, may be necessary. 2
This Article's thesis consists of three prongs that, when combined,
distinguishes it from most other works in this vein. First, the focus of this
Article is on the postinvestigative, adjudicatory stage of criminal
1. For a recent compilation of such proposals, see Symposium, Exonerating the Innocent:
Pretrial Innocence Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 825 (2011/12).
2. Cf Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third
Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1222
(2005) (arguing that scholars should shift their focus from fine-tuning the investigative and proof
process "to broader questions about the structure and administration of the justice system").
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procedure, specifically plea bargaining, trial and sentencing, facets of the
system that to this point have been relatively neglected by would-be
reformers. Second, it looks not only at how the incidence of wrongful
convictions might be reduced at these stages, but also at how these stages
might better deal with wrongful acquittals and the phenomenon of
"wrongful punishment"-the inevitable but reducible inconsistency of
dispositions imposed on those who have committed a criminal act but
whose sentence does not jive with their true culpability and other legitimate
sentencing factors. Third, and most importantly, rather than try to tweak the
current system by providing a better American-style process, this Article
borrows its prescriptions from the inquisitorial model of criminal process
favored in Europe and other civil law countries. While many other scholars
have suggested that we look for help from overseas in fashioning our legal
processes,' the three inquisitorial-oriented proposals made in this paper-to
wit, judicial control of evidence production, nonadversarial treatment of
experts, and unsworn testimony by the defendant-have yet to be presented
together and defended as a package.
Any attempt to import foreign practices into the American system is
fraught with obstacles. An aspect of the inquisitorial system that works in
other cultures may be disastrous in ours. Changing one part of our system
could have unintended impacts on other parts. An isolated component of
inquisitorial practice may not be able to function well, or at all, without
bringing along other components (and, in recognition of this fact, this
Article's focus occasionally strays from the adjudicative process into the
pretrial realm).' This Article tries to address these concerns, but admittedly
can only do so in a speculative fashion.5
It should be noted, however, that while the prescriptions outlined here
are structural, the resulting system would retain many familiar aspects:
lawyers would still function as advocates for their side, parties could still
call witnesses the judge does not call, juries would still be the default
decisionmaker, and a form of plea bargaining would still exist. This Article
does not advocate abandoning the constitutionally required components of
3. One of the best known efforts in this regard is John Langbein's. See generally John H.
Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J.
1549 (1978); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 204 (1979).
4. See infra notes 91, 121, and text accompanying notes 147-48.
5. For a discussion of the pitfalls involved in borrowing from other countries, see Mark
Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits ofStudying Comparative
Constitutional Law, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 327 (1998) (examining the problems "associated with
constitutional borrowing or lending").
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the American criminal justice system, but rather proposes a hybrid between
pure adversarialism and pure inquisitorialism, one that moves closer to the
procedural regime that exists in a number of civil law countries. Contrary
to popular belief, the criminal justice systems in those countries have gone
through their own fundamental changes since the nineteenth century.
Largely as a result of the Anglo-American influence, they abandoned-
long ago in Europe, more recently in Latin America-purely inquisitorial
practices in favor of oral presentation of evidence, mixed professional and
lay tribunals, and increased roles for the parties.6 In a sense, this Article is
arguing for further convergence, this time from the American side.
Part II of this Article explains how the postinvestigation phase of the
American criminal justice system, sometimes called the adversarial trial
process, contributes to inaccuracy at both the verdict and punishment
phases. Part III describes research suggesting that the inquisitorial model of
criminal procedure-in particular, the idea that the court, not the parties,
should control evidence production and presentation-is a superior method
of ascertaining facts, and that, at least in its hybridized form, the model is
no worse than the adversarial system in terms of promoting procedural
justice. Leaning on this research, Part IV spins out some of its possible
implications for American criminal procedure. I argue that the three
inquisitorial components that are advanced in this part can, despite their
foreignness to Americans, be adopted without running afoul of
constitutional guarantees or upsetting the coherence of the system.
II. WRONGFUL VERDICTS, WRONGFUL PUNISHMENT, AND
ADVERSARIALISM
By last count, over 140 people have been released from death row
since 1973, exonerated by DNA or revelations of erroneous eyewitness
identifications, coerced confessions, faulty lab work, prosecutorial
misconduct, and other procedural malfunctions.7  Even the most
conservative estimates of the wrongful conviction rate for serious offenses
puts it at around 0.84 percent overall, with a 0.045 percent rate of error in
cases in which the accused pleads guilty.8 As Michael Risinger points out,
these "number[s] represent[] an absolute floor which the real number is
6. Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 447-50 (2013) (describing the "Americanization" of European criminal
procedure).
7. For a list of the cases and the reasons for exoneration, see The Innocence List, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last
visited Jan. 31, 2014).
8. Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 65, 71 (2008).
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almost certain to be substantially above."9 But even accepting a
conservative 0.05 percent ratio, that means that, every year, roughly five
thousand of the one million people convicted in state court should not have
been. lo
Data on wrongful acquittals are more inchoate, perhaps because such
information seems less salient in a system that assumes a wrongful
conviction to be a much worse outcome. But as David Sklansky has noted,
"wrongful acquittals are a form of injustice" as well, because they slight the
victim;" they also free a person who may be more likely to offend again. It
is likely that the proportion of wrongful acquittals at trial exceeds the
number of wrongful convictions.1 2
Finally, there is the "wrongful punishment" phenomenon, a phrase
that is meant to describe inaccurate punishment of concededly guilty
people. Punishment is inaccurate in two ways. First, it can be inaccurate if
the sentence imposed is not for the specific crime the offender committed.
Second, punishment is inaccurate if the defendant is convicted of the
correct crime, but the sentence imposed is not calibrated to his precise
degree of blameworthiness, risk, or other legitimate punishment criteria. As
with verdicts, the wrongfulness of the punishment can improperly favor
either the prosecution or the defense.
Wrongful punishment is probably much more common than either
wrongful conviction or wrongful acquittals. To the extent it is the result of
different punishment philosophies on the part of the sentencer, it might be
reducible through a guidelines system.13 But sentencing disparities can also
9. D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and
Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 996 (2010).
10. MATT-HEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
206916, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 (2004), available at
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fsscG2.pdf (reporting data on state court convictions). Note also that the
percentage of wrongful guilty pleas undoubtedly is a gross underestimate once prosecutions for less
senous enmes are added into the mix. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1313,
1313 (2012) ("[I]nnocent misdemeanants routinely plead guilty to get out of jail because they cannot
afford bail."). See also Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study ofPlea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 34-36 (2013) (detailing a laboratory study finding that over 50 percent of the "innocent" subjects
pleaded guilty and accepted minimal punishment to avoid more aversive treatment).
11. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 62.
12. David Hamer, The Expectation of Incorrect Acquittals and the "New and Compelling
Evidence " Exception to Double Jeopardy, 2 CRIM. L. REV. 63, 67 (2009) (arguing that, considering the
high burden of proof in criminal cases, the number of wrongful acquittals is likely substantially higher
than the number of wrongful convictions).
13. But see Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 250
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be due to a failure to determine the relevant facts accurately, whether they
have to do with the offense in question, other offenses, or the offender's
character. This latter type of error is undoubtedly substantial.14
Most reformist energy has understandably been focused on reducing
wrongful convictions, through improved interrogation techniques and
identification procedures, defense involvement in the investigation process,
and the like.' Most of these reforms, however, could also increase
wrongful acquittals or inaccurate punishment.16 Moreover, even if the
investigative phase is cleaned up, those cases that go to a jury trial
presumably are still contested, and thus can still result in error. Most
importantly, in the vastly greater number of cases that are resolved through
plea, wrongful punishment is very likely to occur regardless of
improvements at the pretrial stage, because plea bargaining has the effect
of producing sentences that are either too harsh or too lenient.' 7
In other words, focusing solely on reducing wrongful convictions is
short-sighted. While the wrongful felony conviction rate is almost certainly
above 1 percent, it probably is not above 5 percent.' 8 Because wrongful
(1999) (noting disparity even under the federal sentencing guidelines, and ascribing sentencing
differences to differing judicial philosophies); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Excessive Uniformity-and How
to Fix It, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 169, 169 (1992) ("While [under the federal sentencing guidelines] we
have fewer instances of unwarranted differences in sentences imposed in similar cases, we now have a
serious problem of unwarranted similarity in the treatment of substantively distinguishable cases.").
14. See infra note 17; Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 499
(2014) (discussing sentencing errors and appellate review standards).
15. For the best summary of the problems and the respondent reforms, see Dan Simon, IN
DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012).
16. See, e.g., Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 837, 862-63 (2011/12) (asserting that defense attorney involvement in the investigation process
will benefit guilty defendants at least as much as innocent ones); Melissa B. Russano et al.,
Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCL
481, 484 (2005) (reporting a study finding that maximization and minimization interrogation techniques
increased false positives from 6 percent to 18 percent but also increased true positives from 46 percent
to 76 and 81 percent, respectively); Nancy K. Steblay, Jennifer E. Dysart & Gary L. Wells, Seventy-
Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 99 (2011) (reporting a meta-analysis finding that sequential lineups, an oft-
proposed reform in which the eyewitness views pictures or individuals one-by-one, are less likely to
produce false positives but more likely to produce false negatives than simultaneous lineups).
17. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 383-84
(2012) (concluding, based on empirical research, that innocent individuals are often found guilty at trial
and "receive higher average sentences than guilty defendants who face similar evidence and are charged
with similar offenses .. . because guilty defendants more often plea bargain and thereby reduce their
average sentence"); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 83, 155 (2005) (developing, and providing empirical evidence for, a
theory that federal and state courts "produce too many dysfunctional guilty pleas . .. [that] distort the
pattern of outcomes that would have resulted from trials").
18. James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in New York: Moving
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acquittals and wrongful punishments probably occur with more frequency,
reforms aimed only at the first problem, while important, are insufficient.
It is highly likely that the adversarial process is a significant cause of
the various sorts of error just described. Although often touted as one of the
glories of the American system, several commentators have suggested that,
in its Americanized form, the process of allowing the parties to control
examination of witnesses is a highly flawed mechanism for promoting
accuracy. 19 Probably the most venerable source on this score is Jerome
Frank's well-known chapter "The 'Fight' Theory Versus the 'Truth'
Theory" in his book Courts on Trial.20 The following quotation from that
chapter, written during an era when adversarialism was probably nowhere
near as honed as it is now,21 captures the attitude:
[A]n experienced lawyer uses all sorts of stratagems to minimize the
effect on the judge or jury of testimony disadvantageous to his client,
even when the lawyer has no doubt of the accuracy and honesty of that
testimony. The lawyer considers it is his duty to create a false
impression, if he can, of any witness who gives such testimony. If such a
witness happens to be timid, frightened by the unfamiliarity of court-
room ways, the lawyer, in his cross-examination, plays on that weakness,
in order to confuse the witness and make it appear that he is concealing
significant facts.22
Frank mentions an advocacy book that unabashedly describes "how 'a
skillful advocate by a rapid cross-examination may ruin the testimony' of
a "'truthful, honest, over-cautious witness"' 23 and quotes from another
which advises that "'You may. . . sometimes destroy the effect of an
adverse witness by making him appear more hostile than he really is. You
may make him exaggerate or unsay something and say it again."' 24 Frank
Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1246 n.5 (2010) (providing wrongful
convictions estimates of between 2.2 percent and 5 percent, the latter figure tied to particularly error-
prone murder-rape cases).
19. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1975) ("[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of
justice are meant to serve."); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Adversary Process Is Not an End in Itself 2 J.
INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 61 (1999) (criticizing the adversarial advocate's "tricks of persuasion"
that throw "dust" in "the fact-finder's eyes," and concluding that "[a]dversariness harmfully distorts all
the relevant relationships at a trial").
20. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-102
(1949).
21. See infra note 28.
22. FRANK, supra note 20, at 82.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY: CONDUCT OF CASES CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 223 (7th ed. 1884)).
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also cites John Wigmore's statement that "'[a]n intimidating manner in
putting questions ... may so coerce or disconcert the witness that his
answers do not represent his actual knowledge on the subject."' 25 Frank
concludes: "The purpose of these tactics-often effective-is to prevent the
trial judge or jury from correctly evaluating the trustworthiness of
witnesses and to shut out evidence the trial court ought to receive in order
to approximate the truth."26
Most important to notice is that, for this litany of truth-obscuring
practices, Frank does not blame the lawyers. Instead, he states, "If there is
to be criticism, it should be directed at the system that virtually compels
their use, a system which treats a law-suit as a battle of wits and wiles." 2 7
For anyone who thinks Frank's diagnosis is outdated or applicable only to
civil cases, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. 28
In an adversarial system the parties control not only the questioning of
witnesses, but their selection and preparation as well. This aspect of
adversarialism can be a second cause of inaccuracy. Again Frank is worth
quoting at length:
[T]he contentious method of trying cases augments the tendency of
witnesses to mold their memories to assist one of the litigants, because
the partisan nature of trials tends to make partisans of the witnesses.
They come to regard themselves, not as aids in an investigation bent on
discovering the truth, not as aids to the court, but as the "plaintiffs
witnesses" or the "defendant's witnesses." They become soldiers in a
war, cease to be neutrals. 29
When this pressure on witnesses to pick sides affects expert witnesses
25. Id.
26. Id. at 85.
27. Id.
28. For modem examples of prosecutorial adversarialism, see Bennett L. Gershman, The
Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 309, 318-36 (2001) (describing cases in which
prosecutors engaged in impermissible attacks on the defendant's character, introduced misleading or
fabricated evidence, misrepresented or suppressed the truth, and engaged in inflammatory conduct);
Christopher Slobogin, The Death Penalty in Florida, I ELON L. REV. 17, 32 (2009) (describing
wrongful convictions in Florida death penalty cases involving prosecutors who withheld exculpatory
information, knowingly used false testimony, and relied on perjured statements). For more modern
accounts about defense attorney conduct that was intended to or had the effect of obfuscating the truth,
from the criminal defense lawyers themselves, see generally F. LEE BAILEY & HARVEY ARONSON, THE
DEFENSE NEVER RESTS (1971); ROBERT L. SHAPIRO & LARKIN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S BRIEF ON THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (1996). See abo William H. Simon, The
Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1704-05 (1993) (providing examples of defense
attorneys engaging in nonmeritorious delay, use of perjured testimony, and disclosure of tangential
information simply to harm prosecution witnesses).
29. FRANK, supra note 20, at 86.
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it becomes particularly worrisome, since juries are more likely to assume a
scientist, technician, or specialist is neutral rather than attached to the
prosecution or defense. Unfortunately, experts are not immune from the
justice system's adversarial atmosphere. According to a 2000 survey of
trial judges, the most common judicial complaint about experts is their
tendency to "abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that
hired them." 30
A third way adversarialism can contribute to inaccuracy during trial is
its tendency to prevent the factfinder from hearing from the defendant,
despite the fact that the defendant is probably the single most important
source of information about events relating to the offense. The invisibility
of the defendant results, of course, from the routine assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which the Supreme Court
has called the "essential mainstay" of our "accusatorial" system." 31
Mainstay or not, the Fifth Amendment right enables the person who knows
the most about the defendant's actions, motives, desires, and beliefs at the
time of the crime to avoid testifying, which occurs in over half the cases
that go to trial.32
So far this discussion about the accuracy-deflating aspects of
adversarialism has not mentioned the elephant in the room-plea
bargaining, the process that resolves 90 to 95 percent of all criminal
cases.33 Here too the adversarial mindset can contribute to wrongful
convictions, and even more so to wrongful punishment. As federal
prosecutors have admitted,34 in order to "win" at bargaining the
government needs leverage, so it lobbies legislators for easier-to-prove
crimes with stiffer sentences, and legislators, running on tough-on-crime
30. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding
Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 328 tbl.6 (2002).
31. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
32. Data collected in the 2000s indicates that roughly 62 percent of defendants with no record
testify, but only 45 percent of defendants with records testify, so that overall defendants testified in 49.4
percent of the three hundred cases studied. Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on
Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1353, 1357, 1371 (2009).
33. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF
GUILTY, at xi-xii (3d ed. 1999) (stating that 93 percent of cases in federal system and 91 percent of
cases in state systems are resolved through guilty pleas).
34. Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 326, 329 (2011) (stating that the Department of Justice "has sought
more and harsher mandatory sentencing laws 'not because the enhancements are inherently just or
required for adequate deterrence, but precisely because higher sentences provide increased plea
bargaining leverage"').
2014] 707
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platforms, are only too happy to oblige. 3  Because the guilty plea discount
can easily be 100 percent or more even in states with sentencing
guidelines, 36 defendants who are at all risk averse are tempted to plead
guilty to crimes they did not commit.3 7 And partly because, compared to
the disposition that usually awaits a defendant convicted at trial, a
discounted sentence is easy to view as a "win," defense attorneys are often
quite willing to go along with dubious plea offers.38
The connections between adversarialism and plea bargaining go much
deeper than this, however. Plea bargaining is the ultimate expression of the
adversarial tenet that the parties control evidence production. When plea
bargaining occurs, by the time the case gets to a judge the parties have
already settled on all the relevant facts and have usually even come to
terms on the sentence. Thus, guilty plea hearings consist primarily of a
brief determination of whether a factual basis exists for the crime and an
assessment of whether the defendant understands the rights he is waiving. 3
With respect to any sentencing recommendations that are part of the
bargain, the court has even less legal obligation to engage in its own
exploration of the relevant facts.40
35. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
510 (2001) ("[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors
and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of
judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader ones.... Prosecutors
are better off when criminal law is broad than when it is narrow. Legislators are better off when
prosecutors are better off.").
36. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 992 (2005)
(finding increases in sentences for those who go to trial ranging "from 13% to 461% in Washington,
from 58% to 349% in Maryland, and from 23% to 95% in Pennsylvania").
37. An End to Plea Bargains, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2009, 2:27 PM)
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/1784.php ("Of the 227 wrongful convictions overturned in
the United States by DNA testing, 12 defendants pled guilty to crimes they didn't commit. Almost
always, they pled guilty to avoid the threat of longer sentences-or in some cases the death penalty.").
See also Natapoff, supra note 10, at 1331-37 (discussing the incidence of wrongful convictions in
misdemeanor cases).
38. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1205-06 (1975) ("When a defense attorney takes a case to trial and loses, it can . . . be seen in
retrospect that he probably made the wrong decision for his client.... The visibility of a 'wrong'
decision to stand trial may, in this way, provide a further psychological impetus for lawyers to
recommend pleas of guilty to their clients.").
39. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 140 (2004) ("[G]uilty plea hearings are often dry recitations of rights and
facts. Judges advise defendants of a laundry list of procedural rights they are waiving, and defendants
answer 'yes' to indicate that they understand each one. After that, defendants provide very brief factual
statements explaining what they did, which are often written by their lawyers." (footnotes omitted)).
40. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38-39, 43 (1995) (holding that since Rule I l's factual
basis requirement applies only to "plea[s] of guilty," courts must only ascertain the facts underlying the
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Party control over the evidence is so powerful that the Supreme Court
has even permitted pleas by defendants who maintain their innocence.
Although cautioning that judges must, as usual, ensure the factual basis of
such a plea, the Court's decision in North Carolina v. Alford" went on to
hold that "an express admission of guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite
to the imposition of criminal penalty."42 So-called Alford pleas, which put a
judicial imprimatur on guilty pleas by innocent defendants, are highly
questionable as a matter of policy.43 But they are a logical outgrowth of a
system that lets the parties control the production of evidence.
The threat of all of this to accuracy should be apparent. As Stephanos
Bibas has pointed out, the truncated proceeding that is a guilty plea hearing
is "oddly silent about the substantive advisability of the sentences and
consequences being offered, and it require[s] far less than proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."44 Although these words described the state of
affairs before the recent spate of Supreme Court cases regulating plea
bargaining,4 5 they remain substantially true today with respect both to the
overall fairness of bargained-for sentences and the facts underlying them.
Wrongful convictions, acquittals, and punishment are the result of a
number of factors. In the United States, the adversarial adjudication
system-most obviously its surrender of evidence production to parties that
have winning as their main goal and, more speculatively, its immunization
of the defendant from official inquiry-is one of the key culprits. The battle
mentality adversarialism creates can sometimes result in conduct that even
the most avid fan of the American system would reject. The point that this
section has tried to establish, however, is that even run-of-the-mill
adversarialism can create major accuracy problems.
criminal offense, not those related to punishment, and at most need only obtain "a stipulation of facts"
supporting the recommendation).
41. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
42. Id. at 37. The Court's endorsement of the factual basis requirement was lukewarm at best,
and was not described as constitutionally mandated. See id. at 38 n.10.
43. As Albert Alschuler dramatically put it: "There could hardly be a clearer violation of due
process than sending someone to prison who has neither been found guilty nor admitted his guilt. If
anything short of torture can shock your conscience, Alford pleas should." Albert W. Alschuler,
Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L.
REv. 1412, 1412 (2003).
44. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1117, 1131 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (requiring that defendants be informed
of some collateral consequences of a plea); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (tightening
ineffective assistance of counsel standards as they apply to plea bargaining).
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III. THE GENERAL CASE FOR A HYBRID SYSTEM
If adversarialism causes accuracy problems, the question becomes
whether any alternative procedure can reduce these errors. The inquisitorial
model found in Europe-in which the court, usually consisting of one of
more judges, controls the creation of the evidentiary record and the
selection of witnesses and in which defendants routinely testify-appears
to avoid much of the win-at-almost-all-costs mentality that dominates the
American process. But can this less adversarial approach increase
accuracy? And can it do so without infringing constitutional rights? The
two sections in this part answer these questions in a preliminary fashion,
before delving into the details of what an alternative system might look
like.
A. EMPIRICALLY COMPARING ADVERSARIALISM AND INQUISITORIALISM
Researchers have compared the adversarial and inquisitorial models
on a number of different dimensions. In the 1970s, Thibaut and Walker
conceptualized the field by dividing procedural justice into "subjective"
and "objective" components.46 The subjective component measures the
"capacity of each procedure to enhance the fairness judgments of those
who encounter [the] procedures." 47 The objective component is concerned
with "the capacity of a procedure to conform to [the] normative standards
of justice. . . by, for example, reducing some clearly unacceptable bias or
prejudice."4 8 Thibaut and Walker's initial research, relying primarily on
reactions from student participants, compared relatively pristine versions of
the adversarial and the inquisitorial models. A number of other empiricists
have followed in their footsteps, using variations of their methodology.
This research has been summarized elsewhere and will only briefly be
described here.49
With respect to subjective justice, Thibaut and Walker found that their
participants believed the adversarial mode was better than the inquisitorial
mode at providing "process control" (referring to the ability to control the
46. The phrases "subjective justice" and "objective justice" were actually coined by Allan Lind
(who was a sometime co-author with Thibaut and Walker) and Tom Tyler. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM
R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3-4 (1988). But the central concepts
were developed by Thibaut and Walker. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67 (1975) (discussing the "objective functioning" of the two
models as well as the "subjective measure" of how procedural options are perceived).
47. LIND & TYLER, supra note 46, at 3-4.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Mark R. Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin & Tricia Cross, Reconceptualizing Due Process in
Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 974-84 (2006).
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development and selection of information) and that this belief led to a
preference for verdicts obtained through adversarial rather than
inquisitorial procedures.5 0 However, Thibaut and Walker's modeling of the
inquisitorial procedure involved, in their words, "an expert decisionmaker
[who] actively investigates the claims of unrepresented litigants."" In other
words, disputants in this condition were not permitted to present their own
view of the facts unencumbered by interference from the decisionmaker.
More recent research that combines judicial questioning with the ability on
the part of the disputant to present evidence and arguments-a process that
comes closer to modem inquisitorial procedure-produced the opposite
result, that is, a preference for the hybrid procedure rather than the
adversarial one. 52 As summarized by MacCoun "autocratic, inquisitorial-
style procedures (with less process control than the adversarial mode) are
rated more favorably when they provide opportunities for voice." 53
More relevant to the focus of this Article is the research on objective
justice. Here Thibaut and Walker conceded that, based on their research, an
"autocratic" procedure "is most likely to produce truth." 54  More
specifically, consistent with the critique of adversarialism described in the
previous section, they found that the adversarial format produced a more
biased distribution of facts than an inquisitorial format in which a third
party assembled the evidence." More recent laboratory research confirms
this result. Thibaut, Walker, and Lind reported that adversarial attorneys
50. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 46, at 81-96 (describing their research). See also John
Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 551 (1978) [hereinafter
Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure] ("The freedom of the disputants to control the statement of
their claims constitutes the best assurance that they will subsequently believe that justice has been done
regardless of the verdict.").
51. John Thibaut, Laurens Walker & E. Allan Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REv. 386, 388 (1972).
52. See, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 46, at 117 (finding that both adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures can contribute to subjective procedural justice and that policymakers "should be able to
design a variety of hybrid procedures that engender high levels of perceived fairness"); Norman G.
Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes: A Study
of Alternatives to the Standard Adversary Trial Procedure, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361, 375 (1994)
("[T]here are variations in the standard adversarial trial procedure that will permit us to optimize all
criteria for a just system and escape the dilemma of a system that purchases fairness at the expense of
(objective and subjective) accuracy."); Blair H. Sheppard, Justice Is No Simple Matter: Case for
Elaborating Our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 953-56
(1985) (study finding that a majority of the subjects preferred a hybrid procedure over an adversarial
procedure).
53. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword ofProcedural
Fairness, I ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCL 171, 175 (2005).
54. Thibaut & Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, supra note 50, at 547.
55. Id. at 541-53.
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were much more likely to proffer tilted evidence when the facts are
unfavorable, 56 and Sheppard, Vidmar, and Laird found that witnesses
situated in an adversarial setting were more likely to present slanted
testimony than witnesses in the control condition.5 1 O'Brien found that
research participants placed in a "persuade" condition-the condition most
closely analogous to the adversarial position-were much more likely to
succumb to confirmation bias than those in an "outcome" condition-in
which participants were told their goal was to discover what happened; in
fact, the latter group was no more biased than the control group.5 8
Similarly, a study conducted by Simon and his colleagues concluded that
assignment to an adversarial role led participants to biased interpretations
of the evidence in their favor, while those assigned to the inquisitorial role
generally came up with judgments between the two adversarial positions.59
Other, more theoretical research has looked at the accuracy issue
through the prism of economics. These ruminations suggest that the
inquisitorial model comes closer to the optimal use of resources, primarily
because the typical defendant is poor and thus expenditures are likely to be
unequal in the privately-run adversarial proceeding. Deffains and
Demougin's analysis concludes, for instance, that "poor persons will
underinvest in defense while wealthy ones will overinvest" and that "the
feedback of the prosecution's optimal response to the defense behavior will
magnify th[is] effect," leading to an increase in Type I error for poor
defendants (think of the typical victim of a wrongful conviction) and Type
II error for wealthy ones (think of O.J. Simpson).60 In effect, an adversarial
56. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 46 at 28-40.
57. Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence:
Effects ofLawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 320, 329 (1980).
See also Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on Witnesses'
Communication ofEvidence and the Assessment ofAdjudicators, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
888, 895 (1983) (finding that bias may be introduced simply by labeling a witness the plaintiffs or the
defendant's).
58. Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 Mo. L. REV.
999, 1029, 1031, 1049 n.201 (2009). O'Brien also discusses how the prosecutorial desire to avoid
failure overrides the desire to avoid conviction of the innocent and how "cognitive dissonance" leads
prosecutors to construe every new piece of evidence as supportive of guilt. Id. at 1013-15.
59. Dan Simon, Douglas M. Stenstrom & Stephen J. Read, On the Objectivity ofInvestigations:
An Experiment 2 (Aug. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
60. Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in
a Criminal Court Setting, 164 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 31, 42 (2008). See also
Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared,
22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 208 (2002) (although concluding that the adversary system may
produce more information, also asserting that it "conduces rent-seeking because the expenditures of
each party are determined by the private rather than the social cost of winning," whereas judicial
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system at its most efficient is error-prone in a world of unequal resources.61
The research briefly recounted above can be challenged on both
internal and external validity grounds. Most of it was conducted under
artificial conditions (although, if this had any effect, it should have
understated the impact of adversarialism, since the stakes and pressures in
the real world far exceed those typically created in the lab). 62 The most
useful information for purposes of comparing the accuracy of the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems would, of course, provide data on
wrongful conviction, acquittal, and punishment rates in civil law countries.
Unfortunately those data are not available.
There are also a few studies that reach somewhat differing conclusions
than those recounted above. In particular, some empirical literature
suggests that a decisionmaker who becomes actively involved in the
investigation can become prematurely biased in favor of a particular side,
which in criminal cases will usually be the government. Recall, however,
that the focus of this Article is the adjudication stage, after the investigation
is complete. By the trial stage, the pretrial process either has arrived at a
consensus as to guilt or is at an impasse on the issue. Additionally, at the
adjudication stage the judge must operate in open court in full view of the
parties. Based on the available research, the remainder of this Article will
assume that in the trial context the hybrid inquisitorial mode in which the
disputants can have their say is superior to the American-style adversarial
model at avoiding both wrongful verdicts and wrongful punishment,
without a significant sacrifice in subjective justice.
B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A HYBRID CIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The assumption that a hybrid inquisitorial process outperforms the
adversarial process as a truth-finding mechanism does not mean, of course,
involvement in factfinding can improve "procedural economy").
61. Other research has suggested that "expert advocacy is relatively more important to the
operation of adversarial systems than expert judging is to inquisitorial systems," a finding that could
have significant implications in economically strapped jurisdictions. Michael K. Block et al., An
Experimental Comparison ofAdversarial Versus Inquisitorial Procedural Regimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON.
REv. 170, 188 (2000).
62. See Fondacaro, Slobogin & Cross, supra note 49, at 979-80 (describing the limitations of
studies "conducted in the 'laboratory"').
63. See Parisi, supra note 60, at 214 n.51 (citing studies suggesting that because "the adversary
model requires the judge to listen passively to both sides of the case before making a decision, he would
be less likely to become prematurely biased and draw a conclusion too early"). But see Jerry L.
Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362,
1423-34 (2010) (noting that the "inquisitorial" process used to resolve social security claims heavily
favored claimants).
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that the American adversarial trial can or should be thrown over for a
European inquisitorial proceeding. The Constitution ensures that certain
components of the American criminal process are immutable. These
components include the jury, the opportunity to confront one's accusers,
the right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment, and the right
to remain silent during trial under the Fifth Amendment,64 all guarantees
that stem as much from a desire to control state power and enhance the
dignity of the process as from the goal of assuring verdict accuracy.65
While the Supreme Court has indicated that only rights with "deep roots in
our common law heritage" are "fundamental," 66 the pedigrees behind the
jury and confrontation rights and the compelled self-incrimination bar
clearly meet that test.67
Moreover, on several occasions the Supreme Court has expressed
antipathy toward the inquisitorial model.68 For instance, in Blakely v.
Washington,69 which held that a jury must find any fact that enhances a
sentence above the presumptive maximum, the Court declared that the
Constitution "do[es] not admit the contention that facts are better
discovered by judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a
jury."70 In Crawford v. Washington,7 1 the Court held that the civil law
tradition of permitting hearsay in criminal cases was "the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause [in the Sixth Amendment] was directed,"72
and went on to hold that the defendant can demand that the state produce
all of the witnesses who have provided the prosecution with testimonial
evidence, regardless of how reliable those out-of-court statements might be,
unless subjected to cross-examination by the defense at a previous
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V (self-incrimination bar); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to jury,
confrontation, and compulsory process).
65. Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF LAW 753, 756-57, 761 (Robert
J. Janosik ed., 1987).
66. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992).
67. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) ("[T]he right to jury trial in serious
criminal cases is a fundamental right . . . ."); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("[T]he right of
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair
trial which is this country's constitutional goal."); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (.'[T]he
accusatorial system has become a fundamental part of the fabric of our society."').
68. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1634, 1642-68 (2009)
(describing cases where the Supreme Court has supported the confrontational model and rejected
inquisitorialism).
69. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
70. Id. at 313.
71. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
72. Id. at 50.
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proceeding.73 In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court stated that "the American
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial" and went
on to say, as noted earlier, that the Fifth Amendment privilege is the
"essential mainstay" of that system. 74
The Supreme Court has also made the adversarial criminal trial the
reference point for determining the constitutionality of procedures
throughout the rest of the legal system. Even though trial in the juvenile
justice system is not viewed as a "criminal prosecution" and thus is not
governed by the Sixth Amendment or the literal language of the Fifth
Amendment,75 the Court has held that all of the adult criminal system's
attributes but the jury are required in that context (and even without juries,
evidence production in juvenile courts remains the domain of the parties,
not the judge).76 The Court has also made the adversarial system the
lodestar for determining what process is due in other disputes between the
government and its citizens. 77
This mass of constitutional jurisprudence tilted toward adversarialism
does not spell doom for all attempts to integrate inquisitorial components
into the American criminal justice system, however. In particular, the type
of hybrid system that empirical research suggests is best at achieving
objective justice (and at least adequate at achieving subjective justice)
would probably survive constitutional challenge. More specifically, so long
as a "judicial inquisition" maintains trial by jury and the parties' ability to
select and cross-examine witnesses, it will avoid infringing the Sixth
Amendment's guarantees, and so long as it prevents self-incriminating
"compulsion" it can survive a Fifth Amendment challenge.
IV. THREE PROPOSALS FOR A HYBRID REGIME
The hybrid system proposed here would modify the American system
in three ways, corresponding to the three flaws in the adversarial system
identified in Part II. First, the trial judge would be in charge of producing
73. Id. at 68.
74. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (pointing out that the states
labeled juvenile justice laws "civil" rather than "criminal" to avoid the constraints of the Sixth and Fifth
Amendments).
76. Id. at 34-57 (holding that the rights to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and remain
silent, inter alia, apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971) (refusing to apply the right to jury trial to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
77. See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 574 n.252
(2006) (stating that Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court decision that governs due process analysis
outside the criminal process, "accepted as given a baseline of adversarial process").
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the evidence used during the adjudication phase. The judge, not the
lawyers, would make the initial selection of witnesses and would initiate
questioning of any witnesses who are called; jurors too could be
encouraged to ask questions. Second, to the greatest extent feasible, the
judge would control the extraction of information from expert witnesses,
through devices that ensure full revelation of the expert's factual findings
and reasoning. These devices could include court-appointed experts,
regulation of pretrial meetings, greater use of jury instructions, and the
practice of "hot tubbing." Third, defendants would be cajoled into giving
unsworn testimony describing their side of the story and would also be
subject to questioning by the judge. To ensure fair treatment of the
defendant consistent with constitutional doctrine, the European practice of
having the defendant testify first would be modified, and American
discovery and impeachment rules would be adjusted.
These proposals are proffered as thought experiments, with the
recognition that their implementation poses significant challenges. The first
challenge, of course, is that they need to be reconciled with constitutional
guarantees. Second, as occurs with any attempt to insert a new procedure
into a preexisting structure, these proposals have cascading effects on the
rest of the process that need to be recognized. Third, the proposals impose
burdens on various actors, particularly judges, which do not currently exist.
These challenges are addressed in connection with each proposal. They are
significant. But they are not insurmountable.
A. THE JUDICIAL OBLIGATION TO DISCOVER THE TRUTH
In most civil law countries, the trial tribunal is charged with taking
active steps to discover the truth. 8 Aided by a dossier prepared by the
police or the prosecution, the judge organizes the trial and the order in
which witnesses testify. The judge initiates questioning, although, as noted
above, the parties can also examine the witnesses and make arguments
based on the evidence obtained.79 Transposed to the American system, this
format would have a significant impact, which would differ depending on
78. For a description of this requirement in France, Belgium, and Germany, see J.R. Spencer,
Evidence, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 594, 627-28 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer
eds., 2002) (describing the European inquisitorial system of adjudication).
79. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign
Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 361, 367 (1977). For a description of typical criminal trial procedure in
two European countries, see Valdrie Dervieux as revised by Mikadl Benillouche & Olivier Bachelet,
The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra note 78, at 218, 245-47; Rodolphe
Juy-Birmann as revised by Jorg Biermann, The German System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES,
supra note 78, at 292, 314-16.
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whether the adjudication is in front of a jury or a result of plea bargaining.
1. Jury Trials
A judicial inquisition process could improve the accuracy of jury trials
in several ways. First, as the laboratory research reported in Part II
indicates, judicial questioning is likely to produce more facts, or at least
more accurate facts. In contrast to the well-known aphorism about the types
of questions a good adversarial cross-examiner asks, a judge is likely to ask
questions to which he or she does not know the answer.80 A judge would
have no need to engage in the types of manipulation described by Jerome
Frank. 1 While lawyers might still want to grandstand or obfuscate when
their turn comes, any efforts to do so will much more likely be perceived
for what they are, given the facts the judge has already brought out.
Second, because they will be called by the judge rather than the
parties, witnesses will be less partisan themselves. They will be less likely
to see themselves as Frank's "soldiers in a war" 82 and more likely to think
of their role as providing information for the court. While the parties might
still try to influence the witnesses prior to trial, whatever coaching takes
place will be less effective, since the parties cannot know the types of
questions the judge will ask on "direct" examination, nor how much like
cross-examination it will be. Witnesses might also be less intimidated by a
lawyer's cross-examination, if and when it occurs; since they are no longer
testifying "for" the prosecution or the defense, witnesses should be less
defensive about their account.8 3
Third, the greater role of the judge could help redress the imbalance
that almost always exists between the state and defendants, especially when
the defendant is indigent.84 Prosecutors will know that the judge is
80. See Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses, in
ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 131, 145-63, 166 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steve D. Penrod eds., 2003) (making this point and
arguing that the factfinder ought to be allowed to ask questions).
81. FRANK, supra note 20, at 80-102.
82. Id. at 86.
83. Certainly expert witnesses feel more comfortable when they are designated as the court's
witness. See Poythress, supra note 52, at 373 (describing a survey of experts); Sandra Evans Skovron &
Joseph E. Scott, Social Scientists as Expert Witnesses: Their Use, Misuse and Sometimes Abuse, in
EXPERT WITNESSES: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 73, 85 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas
Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987) ("Although a social scientist may be prompted to enter the legal setting by
strong feelings about the matter being litigated, the social scientist is not there to argue or further his
own opinions. He is there to offer his professional opinion on the legal controversy.").
84. See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 911, 912 (2011/12) (stating that the American criminal justice system "is marked
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obligated to look over their shoulder at their investigative techniques, their
participation in discovery, and their trial work in a much more direct way
than occurs under the current system, which depends primarily on defense
discovery of malfunctions.85 As Stephanos Bibas has observed, in a world
of underfunded public defenders, poor defendants "would prefer a quasi-
inquisitorial system, with a neutral magistrate who is charged with digging
up the truth." 86
Despite the Supreme Court's hostility toward "judicial inquisition,"
the hybrid scheme proposed here is not unconstitutional. Because both
parties can still ask questions and call witnesses whom the judge does not
call, Sixth Amendment rights are not infringed. The judge is simply added
as another questioner, albeit the predominant one; as such, this format can
be seen as an accentuation of the current practice of occasional judicial
(and in some states jury) questioning.8 1 Some courts have rightly expressed
dismay over uneven judicial intervention during questioning of witnesses
because of its potential for leading the jury to believe that the judge favors
one side or the other.88 Courts have also been concerned about the effect a
judge's questioning demeanor might have on the jury. 89 However, if the
judge's questioning is confined to the beginning of each witness's
by an adversary process so compromised by imbalance ... that true adversary testing is virtually
impossible").
85. For a rare example of a judge rebuking the government's tactics, see Dervan & Edkins, supra
note 10, at 25-26.
86. Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search
for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 146 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
87. See FED. R. EvID. 614(b) ("The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the
witness."). Even courts that disfavor judicial questioning generally permit it under fairly liberal
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Tilghman, 134 F.3d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing
conviction in the instant case on ground that judicial questioning was impermissible but stating that
"[j]udges may [question witnesses] repeatedly and aggressively to clear up confusion and manage trials
or where 'testimony is inarticulately or reluctantly given."' (quoting United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d
1519, 1525-26 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). Jury questioning is permitted in Arizona. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10);
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e). See also Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 259-61 (1996) (discussing
studies that reported overall positive results from jury questioning procedure).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 932-34 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[G]reat care
must be taken by a judge to 'always be calmly judicial, dispassionate and impartial. He should
sedulously avoid all appearances of advocacy as to those questions which are ultimately to be submitted
to the jury."' (quoting Frantz v. United States, 62 F.2d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 1933))). See also United
States v. Bland, 697 F.2d 262, 265-66 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing situations where judicial questioning
could prejudice a criminal defendant by indicating that the judge favors the government's case).
89. Tilghman, 134 F.2d at 416 ("Because juries, not judges, decide whether witnesses are telling
the truth, and because judges wield enormous influence over juries, judges may not ask questions that
signal their belief or disbelief of witnesses."). A related question is how judges would react to
evidentiary objections to the judge's questions, an issue that does not arise in Europe. See Schlesinger,
supra note 79, at 367 ("(N]o technical rules of evidence impede the process of proof-taking.").
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testimony, the judge conducts the examination in a nonadversarial fashion,
and the parties are permitted to carry out their questioning without
significant judicial interference, neutrality and its appearance can be
maintained.
The greater obstacle to this scheme is the selection and background of
American judges and prosecutors. An inquisitional judge must be able to
plan the trial, conduct much of the questioning, and ensure that witnesses
are handled in as objective a fashion as possible. As Gordon Van Kessel
has pointed out, "the Continental system relies heavily upon the skill,
motivation, discipline, and integrity of its professional judges. It depends
on a fair and efficient judicial bureaucracy buttressed by high standards of
selection, training, and performance, and protected from political and
public pressures by a form of judicial tenure." 90 Similarly, prosecutors need
to be able to prepare a balanced and complete file for the judge;9'
otherwise, the judge's questioning will at best be inefficient and at worst
will completely miss the relevant points. While American judges and
prosecutors are certainly capable of fulfilling these roles, currently they are
not trained to do so. Additionally, in jurisdictions where judges are elected
(which means in most states92), the necessary neutrality may be harder to
maintain.
Moving in an inquisitional direction would not require drastic changes
to the current American system, however. Files resembling European
dossiers are already prepared in many United States jurisdictions. 93 Most
American judges were at one time litigators, and thus, with appropriate
training, should be capable trial organizers and questioners; experience
with managerial judging on the civil side and with magistrate investigations
on the criminal side provide evidence that judges can be quite good at
90. Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 403, 517-18 (1992).
91. Id. at 525 (describing the "Continental procedure[]" of "providing the judge with the
complete case file"). One suggestion for ensuring balance in the prosecutor's file is to permit defense
attorneys to cross-examine witnesses postcharge, with the result admissible at trial only at the behest of
the defense attorney. Donald Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 635, 673-74 (1999).
92. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008)
("[T]he majority of U.S. states have subjected at least some of their courts to popular elections; roughly
ninety percent of state general jurisdiction judges are currently selected or retained this way.").
93. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 972-73 (5th ed. 2009) (stating that
police reports "[m]ost often" contain statements of defendants, codefendants, and witnesses that are
subject to disclosure under discovery rules, as well as "considerable additional information" from
persons whose statements are not subject to disclosure).
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orchestrating the factfinding role.94 While the democratic process can take
its toll on judicial independence, especially when the right result looks
"soft" on crime, 95 judges sitting in jury trials can blame acquittal rates on
someone else. More importantly, even elected judges presumably would
not be as obsessed with win-loss records as prosecutors currently are; with
sufficient education about their new role, their institutional position would
ensure a more neutral inquisition.
2. Plea Bargained Cases
Putting the judge at the controls would have even greater impact in the
huge number of cases that do not go to trial because they are resolved via
plea bargain. As noted earlier, while judges are supposed to ensure such
pleas have a factual basis, they generally rely on the parties' stipulation that
such a basis exists, with very little independent attempt to verify the
stipulation.96 In many civil law countries, in contrast, the guilty plea does
not exist.97 While plea bargaining does occur, it does not eliminate the
requirement of a trial. 98 Similarly, while a defendant's confession will
ordinarily carry considerable weight, the judge must still conduct a formal
proceeding designed to make sure the confession is accurate. 99 Thus, in an
inquisitorial regime both the government's investigative process and its
evidence can be subject to a much more intense scrutiny than that which
occurs at the typical American guilty plea hearing.
94. Cf John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,
825 (1985) (asserting that the trend toward managerial judging is "telling evidence for the proposition
that judicial fact-gathering could work well in a system that preserved much of the rest of what we now
have in civil procedure"); Felix Recio, Tanner Neidhardt & Briana Bassler, Who Is the Magistrate
Judge? Litigating Before U.S. Magistrate Judges in District Courts, 41 ADVOCATE 40, 42-43 (2007)
(noting that in 2006 magistrate judges disposed of 111,543 criminal pretrial matters, including ex parte
probable cause hearings and search warrant proceedings).
95. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 779, 793-96
(1995) (finding a statistically significant correlation between judicial overrides of life sentence
recommendations and the occurrence of judicial elections).
96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. Miximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (2004)
("The inquisitorial procedural structure ... does not include the concept of the 'guilty plea'; it only
includes the concept of 'confession."').
98. See Joachim Herrmann, Bargaining Justice-A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?, 53 U.
PITT. L. REv. 755, 763 (1992) (noting that, in Germany, "a confession does not replace a trial but rather
causes a shorter trial").
99. Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 6, at 453 (stating that "a common aspect" of the plea bargaining
process that occurs in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain "is that judicial control of the plea
bargain . . .usually takes place at the appropriate hearing").
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The potential of this procedure to minimize wrongful convictions and
wrongful punishment should be evident. Alford pleas would be out of the
question. Confessions that result from particularly coercive prosecutorial
offers (and that are therefore the most likely to be false) would also likely
be ignored, if only because heavily discounted charges or sentencing
recommendations most commonly occur in weak cases that the judge iti an
inquisitorial system will dismiss on lack of evidence grounds.100 Perhaps
most importantly, judges would be less likely to follow the parties'
sentencing recommendation, a practice which is standard todaylo even
though the recommendations often depart from established guidelines.102 in
an inquisitorial regime, the judge would have an obligation to conduct an
independent investigation of facts relevant to sentencing, whether that
investigation takes place during a plea hearing or at a separate sentencing
proceeding.' In short, in an inquisitorial regime, the government needs an
actual and strong factual basis for the verdict and sentence, not one simply
agreed upon by the parties.
An inquisitional procedure would place one other serious accuracy-
enhancing constraint on plea bargaining. Because the parties no longer
control the outcome, the prosecution would not be able to condition pleas
on waivers of rights that relate to substantive liability. While this limitation
would not prevent waivers of claims that are irrelevant to or detract from
the merits,104 it would prohibit waivers of Brady claims, due process-based
contentions associated with eyewitness procedures, and other claims that
attack the validity of the guilt and punishment determinations.' 0 5
100. See Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 17, at 363, 395 (discussing reasons why "prosecutors are
expected to make more-rather than less-attractive plea offers in weaker cases that they still decide to
prosecute in an effort to avoid the risk of failure to convict at trial," and reporting a study finding that
"the innocent are less willing to plead guilty and hence only accept plea offers with large sentence
discounts").
101. See Stuntz, supra note 35, at 596 ("Even when sentencing was everywhere discretionary,
judges tended to defer to bargained-for sentencing recommendations.").
102. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
1284, 1285 (1997) (estimating that plea bargaining results in circumvention of federal sentencing
guidelines in 20-35 percent of cases).
103. Judicial determinations of sentencing facts do not violate the Sixth Amendment "Apprendi"
right unless they add to the statutory or guidelines minimum or maximum. See Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) ("This Court's Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a
sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence
in consequence.").
104. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 197 (1995) (permitting a plea agreement
conditioned on waiver of protection against impeachment use of statements made during negotiations).
105. Cf United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-33 (2002) (permitting a plea agreement
conditioned on waiver of the right to access impeachment material and information about affirmative
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Thus, while bargaining would not disappear, it would be less common.
From both a wrongful conviction and a wrongful punishment perspective,
that would be a good thing. From a constitutional perspective as well, this
manifestation of the inquisitorial process can only be viewed positively.
Rather, the main complaint about such a system, an obvious one, is that it
could increase trials beyond the system's capacity, a likelihood brought
home by the fact that in recent years even civil law countries have
introduced what is in effect a guilty plea process, at least in cases involving
minor crimes. 106
If the proposed system took root in the United States, however, the
latter practice would probably, at most, be confined to cases in which little
or no prison time is involved. That is because, given the expense of the
American jury trial compared to its European analogue, American
prosecutors have more incentive to bargain than their European
counterparts; prosecutors will still offer breaks to defendants, simply in
exchange for foregoing a jury trial.107 And as long as there is a factual basis
for any charge reduction prosecutors offer in exchange for a jury waiver,
the judge could not upset the deal, because the charging decision is a
prosecutorial prerogative."o Thus, many trials will resemble (leaner)
sentencing hearings. Furthermore, the cost of the increased number of trials
that would result from the proposal may be offset to some extent by a
reduction in challenges to verdicts (because of the enhanced factual basis
requirement) and a decrease in long sentences (which would be imposed
less frequently once prosecutors lose control over disposition and judges
are truly in charge of calibrating punishment'09). To the extent they occur
defenses); United States v. Scallon, 683 F.3d 680, 683-84 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding plea waiver of the
right to challenge a supervised release); Julian A. Cook, 111, Plea Bargaining, Sentence Modifications,
and the Real World, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 65, 69 (2013) (arguing, consistent with the text, that
"plea agreements should properly be construed as bilateral contracts involving three parties-the
prosecution, the defendant, and the court").
106. See Dervieux as revised by Benillouche & Bachelet, supra note 79, at 245 (describing the
French ordonnance pdnale, or penal order); Herrmann, supra note 98, at 757-63 (describing German
treatment of petty crimes and penal orders).
107. Indeed, plea bargaining developed largely as a tool to avoid time-consuming and
unpredictable jury trials. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 12-44, 111-24 (2003). While laypeople often serve on European courts, they
are much cheaper to select and accommodate. See John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay
Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 101-11 (2006) (describing the
factfinder selection process and evidentiary rules in Europe).
108. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely
in his discretion.").
109. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 1665 (2012)
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separately from these trials, sentencing proceedings should also be shorter,
because judges will already have a good picture of the defendant from the
dossier-driven trial process. From an efficiency perspective, an inquisitorial
regime is less attractive than the current American system, but on balance,
may well be worth it.
Reconceiving the role of the judge as truth-finder should go a long
way toward avoiding the potential for distortion associated with the current
party-controlled system. Judges will not be beholden to the parties' version
of the facts. Judicial questioning should provide more information at the
margin and judicial activism at plea bargaining should also have a truth-
enhancing impact. Two other inquisitorial features should move the system
even further in that direction.
B. THE EXPERT'S OBLIGATION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL
In hotly contested adversarial criminal trials, experts can proliferate.
The prosecution relies on experts primarily to prove the actus reus-for
instance, expert evidence about DNA analysis, ballistics, and causes of
death-and the defense often seeks countering experts. Increasingly, the
defense also uses experts to try to counter testimony by lay witnesses, such
as eyewitnesses or police officers testifying about the interrogation process.
Finally, the defense relies on experts to support defenses for which it bears
the burden of production, such as the insanity defense."10
Unfortunately, as the research reported earlier indicates, the
adversarial process can undermine the objectivity of even the most cautious
expert. In 2009, the National Research Council ("NRC") scathingly
criticized virtually every forensic discipline for relying on deficient
scientific theories and procedures, taking inadequate steps to avoid error
and bias, and fielding experts who overstated their capabilities."' More
importantly for present purposes, the NRC blamed these problems on the
legal system, stating that the process had been "utterly ineffective" in
dealing with them. 112 To improve the situation, the NRC recommended the
(discussing how the "transfer of... more plea-bargaining power from judges to
prosecutors ... result[ed] in higher sentences" (quoting Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and
the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 308
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. To get a sense of the range of experts consulted by the courts, see generally DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN ScIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
(2005).
I1. William C. Thompson, The National Research Council's Plan to Strengthen Forensic
Science: Does the Path Forward Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 35 (2009).
112. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC ScIs. CMTY.. NAT'L RESEARCH
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establishment of a new federal regulatory agency-the National Institute of
Forensic Science-to devise best practice standards, and also
recommended the removal of forensic laboratories from the control of the
prosecution and the police.13
In essence, the NRC proposed a nonadversarial approach to science.
In Europe, an analogue to the NRC's proposed Institute, known as the
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, already exists.11 4 Even in
controversial areas not governed by the institutes, experts in most European
countries are almost always court-appointed rather than selected by the
parties." A number of commentators in this country have proposed, along
similar lines, that trial judges rely more frequently on their authority to
select experts under provisions like Federal Rule of Evidence 706.116
As practiced in Europe, this approach to expertise has much to
recommend it. In Germany, for instance, the parties can respond to the
report of the court's expert in writing, obtain another court-appointed
expert if the first expert's work is deficient, and retain their own experts if
they are not satisfied with the court's."' 7 If this procedure could be
implemented in the United States, it would likely reduce erroneous verdicts
based on flawed science, which the DNA exoneration cases have shown
has played a role in numerous wrongful convictions." 8
Why hasn't such implementation occurred? First, of course, the
adversarial tradition is strong. Inertia is a powerful force against change." 9
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 53 (2009).
113. Id. at 18-20.
114. Ton Broeders, The Role of the Forensic Expert in an Inquisitorial System, in ADVERSARIAL
VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS,
supra note 80, at 245, 248 (noting that the Institute was established in 1994).
115. See, e.g., id. at 246.
116. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 116 (1995)
(arguing that the court should sometimes "go beyond the experts proffered by the parties" and "utilize
its powers to appoint independent experts under Rule 706").
117. See Langbein, supra note 94, at 837-41 (1985) (describing the German expert selection
process in civil and criminal cases). It should also be noted, however, that European courts still exhibit
a strong tendency to rely on written reports rather than on oral testimony. See, e.g., Broeders, supra note
114, at 246 (noting that, in the Netherlands, experts usually submit written reports). That practice would
often be a violation of the Confrontation Clause in the United States. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (holding, in a case involving hearsay from an expert
technician, that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte
out-of-court affidavits").
118. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that in 60 percent of a sample of exoneration
cases, "forensic analysts called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony").
119. See JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-APPOINTED
EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706, at
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Furthermore judges are probably concerned about fairness to the parties.
The fear is that the court's expert will be perceived as more objective or
more qualified than the parties' experts. 120 Finally, and most persuasively,
there can be structural impediments. The European approach works best
when the judge is involved at an early stage of the process and thus can
pick an expert far enough ahead of trial to be useful.12 1 Although this
Article has not shied away from proposing significant structural changes,
routinely inserting a judge into the investigative phase of the criminal
process is probably too much to swallow. 122
An alternative method of injecting an inquisitorial element into the use
of experts in American courts would be to prohibit coaching of experts. In
Europe, this prohibition applies to all witnesses, not just experts, and is
enforced judicially. 123 As strange as this rule may seem to American
attorneys, denial of pretrial witness contact is a natural outgrowth of the
inquisitorial premise that judges, not attorneys, control evidence
production. If the research reported in Part III can be trusted, it is a practice
that would significantly reduce the amount of slanted information experts
provide to the courts.
This scheme might run afoul of constitutional guarantees, however,
specifically the rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process.1 24
20-21 (1993), available at www.fic.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/experts.pdf/$file/experts.pdf (discussing
a survey ofjudges identifying respect for the adversary system as one of the main reasons courts did not
appoint their own expert, despite a deep distrust of party-selected witnesses).
120. Id. at 52-56 (finding that judges favored their own experts over the parties' experts).
121. Compare Langbein, supra note 94, at 841 ("Effective use of court-appointed experts as
exemplified in German practice presupposes early and extensive judicial involvement in shaping the
whole of the proofs."), with CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 119, at 22-23 (noting that nonappointments
under Rule 706 often stemmed from the court not discovering until too late in the process that the
parties' experts were not going to provide credible guidance). Cost is another factor inhibiting court
appointments. Id. at 5, 22.
122. Although the proposal has been made. See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger,
Innocence Is Diferent: Taking Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 869, 890-93 (2011/12).
123. Mirjan Damaika, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1083, 1088-89 (1975) (stating that in a nonadversarial proceeding, "[tihe parties are not supposed to try
to affect, let alone to prepare, the witnesses' testimony at trial. 'Coaching' witnesses comes dangerously
close to various criminal offenses of interfering with the administration of justice"); Langbein, supra
note 94, at 834 ("German judges are given to marked and explicit doubts about the reliability of the
testimony of witnesses who previously have discussed the case with counsel or who have consorted
unduly with a party." (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that due process guarantees the
defendant "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
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If so, at least two other methods of defusing adversarial excess are
available. The first is illustrated by the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Henderson,125 dealing with expert testimony about the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Henderson held that instead of
having opposing experts quibble over how the relatively robust scientific
findings in this area apply to the facts of the case, the trial court should
provide the jury with a detailed instruction describing the relevant findings
about both the psychological factors (for example, weapons focus and
cross-racial identification) and the police practices (for example, failure to
use a double-blind identification process) that can affect eyewitness
accuracy.126 This approach is one way of avoiding the so-called 99:1
problem, where the consensus view is called into question by one (possibly
well-meaning) maverick.127 While the adversarial system exacerbates this
problem by treating the outlier as equal in stature to the representatives of
the consensus view, the more inquisitorial approach taken in Henderson
provides the factfinder with a balanced treatment of the relevant science.
In scientific areas where the science is more heavily contested,
Henderson-type instructions might not be possible. A final mechanism for
reducing the distorting impact of adversarialism has come to be known as
"hot tubbing." Developed in Australia, hot tubbing involves experts,
selected by the parties, sitting side-by-side in the courtroom. It begins with
one expert giving his or her views, which are then subject to questioning by
the other expert or experts, the court and the attorneys; the same procedure
is then followed with the next expert. 128 The advantage of this approach is
that it reduces attorneys' control over the experts, while allowing the
witnesses to provide their opinions in a less adversarial atmosphere.129
125. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
126. Id. at 925-26.
127. Rebecca Haw makes this point well:
The adversarial presentation of expert evidence can exaggerate the importance of a minority
view on a scientific question. As long as there is some scientifically legitimate difference of
opinion, one side can exploit that difference by calling an expert from the minority side. If,
out of one hundred experts, ninety-nine agree on a proposition, one side may call the outlier,
and the other may call one of the heartland experts. This will make a real-world ratio of 991
appear, in the courtroom, closer to 1:1. So the legal system can create an illusion of insoluble
disagreement even if all experts are presumed to be honest, qualified, and unbiased. All
scientific communities have good-faith holdouts and mavericks.
Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in the Battle
ofthe Experts, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1261, 1262-63 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
128. See Elizabeth Reifert, Comment, Getting into the Hot Tub: How the United States Could
Benefit from Australia's Concept of "Hot Tubbing" Expert Witnesses, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 103,
113-14 (2011) (describing the process of "hot tubbing" and explaining why it is not inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
129. An alternative or supplement to hot tubbing is ensuring that the experts meet before trial and
exchange information. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1212.
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While hot tubbing's effect on accuracy has not been studied, 1 0 the research
reported in Part III suggests that its more inquisitorial nature would tend to
reduce bias and distortion in the presentation of expert evidence.
C. THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO TESTIFY
One of the most stunning aspects of European trial procedure to
American viewers is that the defendant is often the first to speak. Usually
the defendant testifies in narrative form, and then is asked questions by the
judge and the parties.13 ' While defendants are told they have the right to
remain silent, they are still required to take the stand and officially refuse to
answer questions, and thus almost all end up testifying.132
As the Supreme Court made clear in Griffin v. Cahfornia when it
prohibited adverse comment about a defendant's decision to forego taking
the stand"' and subsequently applied that holding to sentencing as well,'34
requiring the defendant to testify is an infringement of the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against compelling a person to provide self-
incriminating testimony. From both a wrongful conviction and a wrongful
punishment perspective, however, this prohibition is unfortunate.
Regardless of how it is instructed, a jury tends to believe that a defendant
who does not testify is hiding something.135 Furthermore, the best source of
information about the defendant's actions and mindset at the time of the
offense is usually the defendant, and if he is willing to admit the crime, his
description of his motives and intentions can be essential to calibrating his
culpability and avoiding wrongful punishment.' 36
130. Several authors have speculated favorably on this score, however. See, e.g., Reifert, supra
note 128, at 113-15; Steven Feola & Richard A. Alcorn, Expert Witness Advocacy: Changing Its
Culture, ARiZ. Arr'Y, Mar. 2009, at 24, 30.
131. See, e.g., Dervieux as revised by Benillouche & Bachelet, supra note 79, at 247-48; Juy-
Birmann as revised by Biermann, supra note 79, at 316.
132. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 951, 990-91 (1983).
133. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) ("[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a
remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws." (citation
omitted)).
134. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) ("We decline to adopt an exception [to
Griffin] for the sentencing phase of a criminal case . . . .").
135. See Clyde Hendrick & David R. Shaffer, Effect of Pleading the Fifth Amendment on
Perceptions of Guilt and Morality, 6 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 449, 451 (1975) (describing a study
finding that mock jurors who read a trial transcript in which the defendant invoked his Fifth
Amendment right were more likely to think the defendant committed the crime and more likely to rate
the defendant as significantly less moral than a defendant who testified and denied his involvement in
the crime).
136. Celine Chan, Note, The Right to Allocution: A Defendant's Word on Its Face or Under
Oath?, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 588 (2009) ("Without allocution, much of the information necessary to
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Routine trial testimony by defendants might bring two further
benefits. First, requiring testimony at trial could reduce the incentive for the
police to produce a confession prior to trial. Years ago Edwin Borchard
speculated that the ability to assert the privilege at trial "is probably
responsible for many abuses .... [T]he accused's known privilege of
refusing to testify influences the police to exact 'confessions' which,
whether true or not, stigmatize the system of obtaining them as a public
disgrace."'17  Second, putting the defendant on the stand may also
contribute to subjective justice. Research indicates that defendants often
resent proceedings that do not allow them to tell their story.' 3 8
Thus, importing this aspect of inquisitorialism into the American
process could help reduce both wrongful convictions and wrongful
acquittals and perhaps also improve perceptions of its fairness. But how
can a testimony requirement be implemented, given the Fifth Amendment?
When the defendant has confessed and the adjudication is in essence a
sentencing hearing, this question may not be a pressing one. But in other
situations, it needs a good answer.
One response is to ensure that the defendant's testimony is "unsworn,"
a practice that several countries permit,"I and in fact was routine in this
country until the mid-nineteenth century.140 If testimony is not under oath,
it cannot be used to prosecute the defendant for perjury, and thus avoids the
confession-or-perjury dilemma that is often seen to be the primary rationale
for the Fifth Amendment. 141 Additionally, to assure compliance with the
Supreme Court's holding that the Fifth Amendment prevents the state from
forcing the defendant to testify before he or she has heard all the
achieve the goals of mitigation and individualization-and ultimately, sentencing accuracy-would
never be realized. Indeed, a defendant's allocution is arguably the most important factor in securing an
accurately mitigated and individualized sentence.").
137. EDWIN M. BORCHARD WITH E. RUSSELL LUTZ, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE
ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 371 (1932).
138. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective
on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 887-89 (1997) (reporting research finding that
personal participation enhances perceptions of fairness in plea bargaining, sentencing hearings, and
mediation, and that litigants prefer mediation to adjudication and ex parte settlements reached by
lawyers and judges in part because of the greater opportunity to participate).
139. Van Kessel, supra note 90, at 423.
140. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66-67 (2000) (recounting the colonial practice of
obtaining testimony from defendants, who were "disqualified from testifying under oath").
141. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 766
(1989) (explaining why the Fifth Amendment "privilege can be seen. . . as guarding against a relatively
narrow evil-the practice of forcing individuals to choose between confession and false statement-
either because imposing such a choice is morally problematic, or because suspects who face such a
choice will rarely confess absent unacceptable physical or emotional pressure from the police").
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evidence,14 2 the defendant could also be permitted to speak last, in contrast
to the usual European practice.143
While these two moves would go a long way toward reducing the
tension between the Fifth Amendment and inquisitorialism, it does not
eliminate it, because in the end inquisitorialism demands that the defendant
testify or suffer the consequences. More specifically, if the defendant
remains silent, civil law judges can consider the silence as (negative)
evidence.144 Most American courts would probably hold that practice to be
in violation of Griffin. However, the precise holding in that case was that
"the Fifth Amendment. .. forbids either comment by the prosecution on
the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt."l 45 The literal terms of this language would not be
violated by an inquisitorial proceeding that avoided both prosecutorial
comment on the accused's silence and instructions about the meaning of
silence, and instead allowed the relevance of the court's request for
testimony and the defendant's refusal to provide it to be determined by the
jury. Nonetheless, Griffin would probably have to be overturned to remove
all doubt on this point.146
142. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972) ("Pressuring the defendant to take the
stand, by foreclosing later testimony if he refuses, is not a constitutionally permissible means of
ensuring his honesty.").
143. In many European jurisdictions, the defendant not only testifies first but is also permitted to
make a final statement. Van Kessel, supra note 90, at 424. However, the fact that the defendant must
talk before hearing the accusers probably violates Brooks. Of course, as suggested in the text, if Grffin
were overturned, Brooks could be as well. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 610-11 (indicating that the holding
depended on Griffin).
144. Although in most European countries today the factfinder is technically not permitted to
draw adverse inferences from silence, "Continental prohibitions on adverse inferences from defendant's
failure to speak are rather anemic" and Continental procedure "strongly encourages the defendant to
respond to questions by exacting a heavy price for remaining silent." Gordon Van Kessel, European
Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 823, 833
(1998). Furthermore, at least in Germany, if the defendant answers some questions and refuses to
answer others, even the technical prohibition on adverse use disappears. Schlesinger, supra note 79, at
379-80.
145. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
146. In practice, Griffin is on its last legs. A number of Supreme Court cases have undermined its
import. See White v. Woodall, _ S. Ct. _ (2014) (holding that state court's decision to uphold trial
judge's refusal to give jury instruction against drawing adverse inferences about offender's failure to
take the stand during capital sentencing phase not an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000) (concluding that a prosecutor's statement
during closing argument that defendant had the opportunity to listen to the state's witnesses and tailor
his testimony accordingly did not violate Grifflin); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988)
(holding that a prosecutor's comment about defendant's failure to take the stand is a "fair response" to
defense attorney's claim that defendant could not tell his story and does not violate Grffin); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507-09 (1983) (finding that repeated violations of Griffin can be
harmless error). At least two justices would clearly vote to overturn it. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct.
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Whether that overruling occurs explicitly or implicitly, two other steps
can be taken to allay defense attorney concerns. First, as occurs in many
European countries and is recommended by several American scholars, 14 7
the defense should have full access to the prosecution's dossier, in order to
better structure the defendant's testimony. 148 Second, to remove the most
powerful subconstitutional objection to putting the defendant on the stand,
the defendant should not be impeachable with prior offenses.149 The
relationship of previous criminal behavior-even fraudulent behavior-to a
witness' current credibility is extremely tenuous at best.15 0 But even if the
impeachment rule is maintained for other witnesses, it could be relaxed for
defendants giving unsworn testimony, since the factfinder will undoubtedly
already assume this testimony is self-serving and will need no (tangentially
relevant) reminder of that fact.
V. CONCLUSION
Integrating inquisitorial features into an adversarial system is risky
business. This Article's proposals-judicial control of guilt and punishment
adjudication, inquisitorial treatment of experts, and a requirement that the
defendant give unsworn testimony-are alien to American trial procedures.
Most importantly, these proposals transfer a significant amount of power
from lawyers to judges.
2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Griffin is impossible to square with the text of the Fifth
Amendment."). Reversal of Griffin would of course also nullify Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288
(1981), which requires an instruction to the jury that adverse inferences may not be drawn from the
defendant's failure to testify.
147. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 84, at 937-39 (describing various proposals and stating that
"[fjull disclosure of the prosecutor's file is not unworkable").
148. See Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 6, at 433 ("The investigative dossier ... may be consulted by
both parties at the beginning of the preliminary (and judicial) investigation.").
149. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(b) (permitting introduction of a prior offense for which the
penalty is a year or more to impeach a defendant "if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to that defendant"); Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of
Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1,
47 (1999) (noting that "many criminal defendants" choose not to testify to avoid the prejudicial impact
of prior conviction impeachment).
150. Cf Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 247 (1975) (discussing a study concluding that
the groups with knowledge of the defendant's prior conviction rarely used it in weighing his
credibility); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy ofLimiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985) (discussing
a study finding that "[t]he defendant's credibility is already so much lower than that of the other
witnesses (because it obviously is in the defendant's self-interest to give testimony which favors his or
her position) that the admission of prior convictions does not reduce the credibility of the defendant
firther").
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But that, of course, is the goal. Adoption of these proposals would
tone down the adversarial tenor of the process and therefore, if empirical
research is any guide, enhance adjudicative accuracy. The proposals would
also provide the factfinder with more information, particularly from
experts, who increasingly appear in criminal courts, and from defendants,
whose testimony can be especially crucial in avoiding wrongful acquittals,
but may also help avoid wrongful punishment and wrongful convictions.
Even when the parties plea bargain, trials would still occur, and the
enhanced judicial inquiry requirement would provide more protection
against erroneous convictions, particularly of poorer defendants, who are
less likely to benefit from aggressive investigation and negotiation by their
attorneys. Furthermore, all three proposals can be implemented without
infringing fundamental constitutional rights. In short, instituting these
proposals could reduce wrongful convictions, wrongful acquittals, and
wrongful punishment at a cost that is legally and fiscally acceptable.
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